Methods This paper provides an analysis of the disability discrimination problem. Then, adapting a fixed-plus-variable framework proposed in welfare economics to the case of health measurement, it proposes a novel measure called the Ethically Adjusted Life Year (EALY).
Background
Summary measures of population health are important for health policy and planning. They can be used for many purposes including priority setting, evaluating population health over time, health system administration, and policy and planning-see Murray et al. 1 These measures typically combine information on mortality and disability (taken to include any diminishment in health status however minor or temporary) into a single metric. The measure we focus on is the Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) due to the wide interest it has generated and its many applications (see Oostvogels et al.
2 ), although much of the discussion we carry out also applies to other health metrics. The DALY is the basis for the most comprehensive attempt to measure global population health, embodied in the Global Burden of Disease study, [3] [4] [5] [6] and is widely used for cost effectiveness analyses and to set medical priorities.
This paper considers the objection that the DALY discriminates against the disabled; firstly, the measure gives less credit to (otherwise equivalent) health interventions that save the lives of disabled people. Secondly, under certain circumstances it gives priority to health-improving interventions over lifesaving interventions when the life at stake is that of a disabled person. (An additional disability discrimination objection is that the same amount of health care given to a person with a disability will often yield less health benefit for that person; this may be because some disabilities make it harder to successfully treat others. This second issue is beyond the scope of our paper-for a discussion, see Brock 7, 8 ). This concern generated a body of literature arguing for avoiding disability-based discrimination-see Nord 9, 10 , Nord et al. [11] [12] [13] , Ubel et al. 14 and Johannesson. 15 In the words of Mont, 16 'The fear is that this fact will drive resources away from disabled people, making them even more vulnerable and disadvantaged than they already are in many societies' (p. 1658).
of discrimination through a multiplicative functional form bringing about a revaluation, or upper-end compression, of health states (see Nord et al. 11 ), this measure is developed using a fixed-plus-variable measurement framework adopted in welfare economics (see Bourguignon and Fields, 17 Esposito and Chiappero-Martinetti, 18 Anderson and Esposito 19 and note that an alternative approach, suggested by Johannesson, 15 differs from ours and was criticized by Ubel et al., 14 Norheim et al. 20 and Ord 21 ). This enables the researcher to introduce a discontinuity in the possible tradeoffs among bearers of value when one value is lexicographically more important than another. We outline and discuss three principles delineating the importance of alleviating disability and extending life years [Disability Monotonicity (DM), Life Egalitarianism (LE) and Life Supremacy (LS)].
Results

Summary measures of population health: the DALY
The DALY is calculated by summing up (i) years of life lost because of death occurring earlier than the~80 years of age taken as benchmark (each year lost is given a value of 1) and (ii) years of full health lost due to disability (every year in non-perfect health is given a value of between 0 and 1 depending on the severity of the disability). The DALY measure reads as follows:
DALY YLL Years of Life Lost YLD Years of Life lost due to Disability
Imagine two people, h and d, who on their 60th birthday die of a heart attack. Both fall 20 years short of the 80 years benchmark-and for them both YLL = 20. However, while h has been healthy throughout all of the 60 years lived, at the age of 50 d became disabled. The DALY accounts for this disability-related health burden through the YLD component. These 10 years count not as 'full years' but as 'fractional years': to each of these years a weight between zero and one is applied depending on the severity of the disability. While the YLD component for h would be zero (she has spent all of her years alive in perfect health), for d it would be 0.6 × 10 = 6 (assuming a weight of 0.6). The total burden for h would be 20 + 0 = 20, while for d it would be 20 + 6 = 26.
DALY: assessing impact and evaluating interventions
While it appears reasonable to say that the health burden was larger for d than for h, in the following two illustrations it is more difficult to accept the DALY's evaluation of the outcome. This is because the existence of a disability automatically reduces the value of a life year of a disabled person. Since we address the discrimination brought about by the DALY between a healthy and a disabled person, our illustrations feature two individuals. The evaluation of longevity versus healthiness trade-offs for the same person does not present the same type of discrimination concern and hence, whilst interesting, is not pursued in this paper.
Health trumping life case
Imagine that on their 60th birthday d (who has a 0.6 disability) has a heart attack while h (who is completely healthy) has a stroke. Available resources only allow us to carry out one intervention. Not intervening on the heart attack would mean death for d while not intervening on the stroke would mean that h gets a 0.7-weighted disability.
What should we do? The impact of acting on d would be eight DALYs averted; the impact of acting on h would be 14 DALYs averted. The DALY would favour the maintenance of h's healthy state at the expenses of d's life, a judgment reminiscent of Sparta's cliff. Many find this behaviour undesirable because they believe sensitivity to the extent of disability should not translate into preference for a health improvement over life saving because the person whose life is at stake is disabled. (This should be intended in per-year terms, as will be clarified below, so that we are not comparing, say, extending life for 1 year against a health improving procedure yielding benefits for 30 years.)
Lifeboat dilemma case
Suppose that both d and h face a life-threatening heart attack and, due to resource constraints, only one of them can undergo a life-saving procedure If we were to decide whether to act on d or on h on the basis of which intervention would maximize the DALYs averted, in the case of h the impact of the procedure would be 20 × 1 = 20, while in the case of d it would be 20 × (1-0.6) = 8. The procedure saves their lives and grants 20 additional life years to both h and d; but in the case of the latter it leads to less benefit because this person has a disability-and this would be so whether the disability is a major or an extremely mild one. This may be discriminatory, because the life of a disabled person counts for less than the life of a healthy person; prioritizing the latter may also be unfair, for example, since on top of having enjoyed better health, h would also enjoy longer life than d. Note, this critique does not require denying the existence of reasons for deciding to save h's life. In this lifeboat dilemma type of situation where a (however tough) decision has to be taken, one could certainly argue that a world with h rather than with d would be a healthier world, or that the pressure on the health system would likely be lower with h alive rather than d. This lifeboat dilemma illustration highlights a tension between the desirable behaviour of a health measure and that of a measure of the ethical value of health interventions-we shall come back to this tension below.
Ethical principles for assessing impact and evaluating interventions
In order to tackle the two types of discrimination discussed above, we lay out the following ethical principles:
I. Disability Monotonicity (DM): Disabilities should count according to their severity; more severe disabilities should count more than less severe disabilities. II. Life Egalitarianism (LE): An additional life year granted should count equally, regardless of the health status of the person; i.e. a k-year increase in the life of a disabled person should count as much a k-year increase in the life of a non-disabled person. III. Life Supremacy (LS): A life year saved counts more than any disability year alleviated; i.e. extending a person's life by k years (whatever her disability) counts more than alleviating a disability for k years (whatever the disability).
Note that we have laid out the above properties in 'per-year' terms (i.e. granting 1 life year has priority over a 1-year health improvement). We do not blindly favour procedures, which extend life for a short time over long-lasting health improvements-e.g. the treatment of a child's disability can be given priority over saving the life of an elderly person. In addition, by 'saving life/extending life/granting a life year' we do not consider situations such as extending the life of a person in a vegetative state, where doubt can be cast on the value of such life years altogether. Similarly, understanding how to deal with futile care interventions is certainly an important issue, which, however, goes beyond the scope of our paper. The EALY builds upon the fixed-plus-variable framework proposed in welfare economics by Bourguignon For each individual, life is accounted for by the fixed component LYA and degree of healthiness by the variable component LYQ. LYA will be chosen as ≥α (we will suppose α = 1 in what follows) when the life year is spent alive (or when the life year is lost if we are measuring burden) and 0 otherwise. LYQ is a healthiness/unhealthiness parameter ranging from 0 to α depending on the health status of the individual, in a similar fashion to the disability weights used in the DALY. This variable component accounts for the severity of the disability and hence grants the accommodation of principle DM. Since LYA is fixed and is weakly greater than the maximum of the variable component, life-saving interventions are prioritized over health-improving ones, as prescribed by principle LS. When the choice is between two life-saving interventions regarding individuals with different health statuses (like h and d in our examples), discrimination against the less healthy is avoided (as prescribed by LE) as long as the components LYA and LYQ are interpreted as truly separate domains, as we shall clarify in 'Discussion' section.
The choice of the exact value of LYA will depend on the degree of substitutability between extending by k years one person's life and:
i. alleviating for k years a certain disability of n people; ii. alleviating the disability of one person for l > k years; iii. both things, that is, alleviating a certain disability of n people for m years (with m larger or smaller than k).
For example, the choice of LYA = 1 implies that extending by k years one person's life is as valuable as bringing about a 0.1 alleviation for 2k years in a disability affecting five people (or for k/2 years and 20 people, etc.).
Discussion
Main findings of this study
We discuss here the recommendations offered by the EALY in the case of the illustrations proposed in the Results. We account for two possible interpretations of the relation between LYA and LYQ. The first interpretation sees LYA and LYQ as genuinely different components and focuses on the strict impact of interventions (i.e. the impact of refraining from a life-saving intervention is confined to the loss of life and does not reverberate to the LYQ component). The second interpretation implicitly views LYQ as a function of LYA in the sense that when an individual loses her life, her health goes to zero. 
Health trumping life case
Lifeboat dilemma case
Here, recall that both d's and h's lives are at stake and the interventions relate to saving life rather than improving health; it follows that for both d and h the LYA component in the case of non-intervention is zero while the LYQ component is not directly affected. A focus on the objective of the intervention (in conformity with the first interpretation, which keeps the two components independent from each other), leads to the outcome that the two life-saving interventions are given the same importance-in accordance with the LE principle. The second interpretation instead imposes the collapse of the LYQ component in case of non-intervention (because the person would die); as a consequence, since this component is greater for h, the intervention saving her life would acquire more value-in contrast with the LE principle. In other words, analytically, the avoidance of the discrimination of d in a lifeboat dilemma situation is grounded in the independence of the LYA and LYQ components. 
What is already known on this topic
It is worth pointing out that the EALY differs significantly from the other proposals to address the disability objection. Nord et al.
11 increase the value of life extension compared with health improvement through multiplicative weights and an upper-end compression of health states, which 'would eliminate much of this devaluation of life extending programmes for the disabled' (p. 36), an approach which can also be found in Nord 9 and Ubel et al. 14 The separation of life extension and health improvement is implemented by adopting some values attached to health states (e.g., see, Tab. 14 in Nord 9 ) in the case of health improving interventions, while life-saving interventions are attached a value strictly equal to 1.
What this study adds
The difference with our proposal is neat and resides in the ability of our fixed-plus-variable framework to disentangle, and jointly account for, both life-saving and healthimproving interventions. It is also possible to see the importance of these differences in the light of the following example from Ubel et al.
14 : 'Treatment A saves the life of a patient with a … [0.2] disability. Treatment B simultaneously saves the patient's life and cures her of a similarly severe disability. In the QALY model, treatment A would yield 0.8 QALY, and treatment B would yield 1 QALY. Yet in our model, both would have a societal value of 1.' This is different from our fixed-plus-variable approach because treatments A and B would have a value of 1 and 1.2, respectively. Ubel et al.
14 argue that their model's inability to recognize the greater value generated by treatment A is less worrying than the DALY's undervaluing of life-saving treatments for disabled people. Finally, it is worth noticing that the DALY would be able to accommodate LS if its disability weights (which are derived through surveys) were capped at 0.5.
Limitations or this study
While DALY's deliberative approach is extremely valuable (yet see the methodological critiques in Voigt and King 22 we believe that the analyst can limit its scope). In order to avoid undesired consequences such as undesirable discrimination (of which most likely respondents are not fully aware)-weights could still be determined through surveys but with a ceiling in order to avoid disability-based discriminations.
Conclusion
This paper addressed the concern that DALY-type measures discriminate against disabled people as they give less credit to health interventions that save the lives of disabled, as opposed to non-disabled people, and allow priority to be given to health-improving interventions over life-saving interventions when the life at stake is that of a disabled person (while the same does not happen if the life to be saved is of a non-disabled person). We proposed a new measure, the EALY, and discussed it in light of three principles concerning disability alleviation and life-saving decisions. The EALY measure is sensitive to the amount of health improvement brought about by an intervention but, at the same time, gives priority to saving life over health improvement. As we remark, the importance attributed to saving life should not be taken as a sort of life-saving fundamentalism; we abstract, e.g., from futile medical care situations and the priority to life saving interventions is intended in per-year terms. As to discrimination against the disabled stemming from the choice of saving the life of a healthy person over that of a disabled person, the EALY framework illustrates that this can be avoided by keeping the life and the disability components separate and accounting only for the direct impact of interventions; in this way life-saving interventions are deemed equally worthwhile regardless of whose life is saved. When evaluating the ethical value of interventions, we may have to take other factors into account and depart from the goal of health maximization. After all, it is by doing this that we leave Sparta's cliff behind.
